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Just one week separated the Supreme Court's announcements of its
decisions in Brown Ill on May 31, 1955, and Williams v. Georgia, on June
6, 1955. Del Dickson's fascinating account of Williams reveals the two
decisions to be mirror images. Through his reconstruction of the Justices'
deliberations in Williams, Professor Dickson shows the Court struggling with
the same jurisprudential issues as in Brown II and reaching a virtually identical
resolution-one that was novel, confusing, and ultimately misunderstood.
The conventional account today of Brown II is that the Justices were so
acutely aware of the political vulnerability of their 1954 decision in Brown
I-so fearful about the prospects of Southern resistance to school desegregation
and the Court's practical impotence in forcing compliance-that they retreated
from the high ground of constitutional principle by endorsing the "deliberate
speed" implementation formula. Some critics have maintained that the Court
committed a strategic error in Brown II; they argue that the white Southern
elite would have accepted a clear-cut desegregation order and obtained at least
grudging popular acquiescence among its constituents, but the Court's
pronounced tolerance for delay opened the way for successful demagogic
appeals to massive popular resistance.3 Others have faulted the Court,
regardless of its strategic sense, for allowing its fear of popular resistance to
lead it to compromise and thereby abandon constitutional principle.' These
critics have readily invoked such honored aphorisms as "justice delayed is
justice denied" or "fiat justicia ruat caelum," the Latin formula which, as
Dickson has ironically observed, is inscribed in marble above the Georgia
Supreme Court's bench. Even Alexander Bickel, who praised Brown II as a
proper acknowledgement by the Justices of the tensions between "principle"
t Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2. 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
3. Justice Hugo Black expressed this view in a 1968 public recantation of Brown I. Black Believes
Warren Phrase Slowed Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1968, at Al; see also JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, THE
NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 46-91, 146-49 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Rights
Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REV. 817, 827-28 (1987); Robert L. Carter, The
Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237, 243-44 (1968).
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and "expediency" in a democratic polity, seemed to undermine his own
approbation by his very terminology.'
But the Court's decision in Williams v. Georgia provides a different
perspective on the Justices' contemporaneous deliberations in Brown I.
Whatever the Justices might have feared regarding elite or popular reception
of any order for immediate school desegregation, they had no remotely
comparable reason to anticipate resistance to an order for a new trial for Aubry
Williams. Just two years earlier, in Avery v. Georgia,6 the Supreme Court had
ruled that the jury selection process later at issue in Williams was
unconstitutional; and the state court had acquiesced, setting aside James
Avery's death sentence and imposing a prison term instead based on his guilty
plea. The next year, the Georgia Supreme Court-though affirming Williams'
death sentence on procedural grounds-openly, and apparently ungrudgingly,
acknowledged that the racially discriminatory jury selection practice used in
Williams' case had "been condemned by this court and the Supreme Court of
the United States." 8 The Georgia Court issued its opinion, with this
recognition of the constitutional guarantee against race discrimination and the
Supreme Court's role in its effectuation, on May 10, 1954-just ten days
before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Brown L
If the Supreme Court thus had no reason to fear that a decision
invalidating Aubry Williams' conviction based on race discrimination would
be met by Southern white resistance, why nonetheless did the Court hesitate
to reach this result? The Court adopted virtually the same approach in Williams
v. Georgia as it had in Brown II one week earlier: pointing to the
antidiscrimination principle that the state had violated, implying that the Court
itself had clear authority to order immediate redress of this violation, but
nonetheless declining to exercise this authority while at the same time clearly
expressing its hope and expectation that the state would voluntarily repent. If
the unusual resolution in Williams was prompted by some motive other than
a fear of noncompliance, other than "political expedience" in this sense, that
motive might suggest an explanation for the Justices' similar resolution in
Brown IL
Although Professor Dickson has not identified any single, clear-cut motive
for the Court's action in Williams, some plausible speculations do arise from
his account. It is evident from the Justices' deliberations that most of them
were convinced that the Georgia courts had not invoked their procedural
ground as a ruse to deny Williams' constitutional right against race
5. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 68 (1962); cf. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I, 3 (1964).
6. 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
7. See BARRETT PREIYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 294 (1961).
8. Williams v. State, 82 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ga. 1954).
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discrimination; accordingly, the Justices were troubled about the basis for their
jurisdiction, in light of the apparently independent, adequate state procedural
ground. At the same time, a majority of the Justices were unwilling to let the
matter pass. This much is clear from their ultimate disposition. But why? What
was it about Williams' case that nagged at the Court majority and made them
unwilling to adhere to their own initial impulse to deny certiorari or to the
persistent imprecations of successive squads of their (Harvard-trained) law
clerks?
Although at various points in their deliberations several of the Justices
spoke about the special force of the death penalty, it nonetheless seems likely
that Williams' sentence was not the primary impetus for the Court's reluctance
to decline intervention. In the opening paragraph of his dissent, Justice Clark
set out the perspective that almost certainly was shared by most members of
the Court at that time:
While I, too, am not deaf to the pleas of the condemned, I cannot
ignore the long-established precedents of this Court. The proper
course, as has always been followed here, is to recognize and honor
reasonable state procedures as valid exercises of sovereign power. We
have done so in hundreds of capital cases since I have been on the
Court, and I do not think that even the sympathetic facts of this case
should make us lose sight of the limitations on this Court's powers.9
There was no Court majority in 1955 pressing against the existence of capital
punishment; whatever distaste the Justices might have had for it, they were not
then intent on combating the legitimacy of the death penalty.'0
In 1955 there was a Court majority-indeed, unanimity-for a different
proposition, unrelated to capital punishment as such: the Brown I proposition
that race discrimination was a moral blight and a constitutional wrong that had
been practiced in the South and tolerated in the North for too long." By
1955, the Justices had struggled together for more than a decade about the
relationship between the moral and the constitutional status of Southern race
discrimination. Questions about the morality and constitutionality of racial
subordination were of course as old as the American republic, but the Second
World War had powerfully intensified their moral salience. In his influential
study published in 1944, the War still raged, Gunnar Myrdal emphasized this
changed context, drawing conclusions for American legal institutions
specifically:
9. Villiams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 393 (1955).
10. For the emergence and subsequent collapse of this intent on the Court during the following three
decades, see Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MIcH. L.
REV. 1741 (1987).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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[JIn this War the principle of democracy had to be applied more
explicitly to race [than in the First World War]. Fascism and nazism
are based on a racial superiority dogma-not unlike the old hackneyed
American caste theory-and they came to power by means of racial
persecution and oppression. In fighting fascism and nazism, America
had to stand before the whole world in favor of racial tolerance and
cooperation and of racial equality. It had to denounce German
racialism as a reversion to barbarism. It had to proclaim universal
brotherhood and the inalienable human freedoms.
The world conflict and America's exposed position as the
defender of the democratic faith is thus accelerating an ideological
process which was well under way [before the War]. In this dramatic
stage of the American caste struggle a strategic fact of utmost
importance is this, that the entire caste order is extra-legal if not
actually illegal and unconstitutional. The legal order of the land does
not sanction caste but, on the contrary, is framed to guarantee equality
and to suppress caste. The only important exceptions are the Jim
Crow laws in the Southern states. But even they are written upon the
fiction of equality .... 12
In the succeeding decade, this exceptional legal recognition for the racial
caste system became increasingly intolerable to the Supreme Court Justices;
in a series of cases involving such matters as voting rights, 3 interstate
transportation,' 4 and graduate school education,' 5 the Court gave clear
indications that it disapproved of Southern segregation practices. But the
Justices nonetheless hesitated from striking directly at the keystone of the Jim
Crow regime: the "separate but equal" formula that Plessy v. Ferguson6 had
endorsed a half-century earlier as a constitutionally acceptable basis for the
post-slavery perpetuation of the racial caste system. 7 Although the Justices'
reluctance to confront Plessy was partly motivated by concern about the
likelihood of Southern white resistance, they did not see this as the only-nor,
I believe, the most important-impediment. In 1954, the fundamental barrier
in the minds of the Justices to striking at the heart of Jim Crow and overruling
Plessy was their concern about the lawfulness of such action.
12. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
1004, 1009 (1944).
13. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating exclusion of blacks from primary
elections).
14. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (overturning, as burden on interstate commerce, state
law requiring segregation of passengers on interstate carriers).
15. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (declaring racially separate state law schools inherently
unequal); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding segregation of black student
from whites enrolled in same graduate school program inherently unequal).
16. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 ("Nor need we reach petitioner's contention that Plessy v. Ferguson
should be reexamined .... ); cf Elman, supra note 4, at 821-22.
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This apparent conflict between the mandates of morality and the
commands of positively enacted law in general, and between the personal
convictions and formal role obligations of state officials in particular, was not
a new problem in the mid-1950's. Before the Civil War, American judges and
lawyers had agonized over this conflict with regard to slavery, and most of
them ultimately decided against acting on the basis of their "merely personal
morality."' 8 The experience of the Second World War, however, put new
pressure upon this conventional lawyerly inclination. Justice Jackson felt this
pressure in an intensely personal way during his leave from the Supreme Court
from May 1945 to October 1946, when he served as United States prosecutor
at the first of the Nuremburg trials for "atrocities and war crimes."' 9 The
central legal issue at these trials was the propriety of imposing judgment on
German officials for conduct that was legally approved by the formally
constituted state in which they had served. The force of the Nazi example, and
the evident parallels between the Nazis' racism and Jim Crow, must have
underscored this enduring tension between the obligations of personal morality
and state authority-not only for Jackson, but powerfully (if less directly) for
the other Justices as well. No one who witnessed the genocidal atrocities
carried out by German state officials could view this tension as a question for
merely academic or remote historical reflection.
On the one side, the Justices were pulled by a conviction that judicial
invalidation of "separate but equal" could not easily be justified by positive
law as conventionally conceived-that is, from such sources as longstanding
judicial precedent and the original intent of the constitutional draftsmen.2" On
the other side, they were pulled by a heightened sense of moral urgency about
the wrongfulness of Jim Crow. This was the tension posed in separate
memoranda that Justices Frankfurter and Jackson wrote but never published,
and perhaps never even circulated to their colleagues. In 1953, before the
Court decided Brown I, Frankfurter wrote:
[I]t is not our duty to express our personal attitudes toward these
issues however deep our individual convictions may be. The opposite
is true. It is our duty not to express our merely personal views.
However passionately any of us may hold egalitarian views, however
fiercely any of us may believe that such a policy of segregation as
undoubtedly expresses the tenacious conviction of Southern States [is]
both unjust and short-sighted, he travels outside his judicial authority
18. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
19. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBURO TRIALS 39, 45-46, 611 (1992). In 1954,
Jackson wrote that this prosecutorial service was "the most important, enduring, and constructive work of
my life." Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL at xxxvii (1954).
20. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1955); ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSITrUTION IN CONFLICT 11-14 (1992).
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if for this private reason alone he declares unconstitutional the policy
of segregation.2
Similarly, in February 1954, Justice Jackson wrote:
[W]e can not oversimplify this decision to be a mere expression of
our personal opinion that school segregation is unwise or evil. We
have not been chosen as legislators but as judges .... This Court
must face the difficulties in the way of honestly saying that the states
which have segregated schools have not . . . been justified in
regarding their practice as lawful. And the thoughtful layman, as well
as the trained lawyer, must wonder how it is that a supposedly stable
organic law of our nation this morning forbids what for three quarters
of a century it has allowed.22
The Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Georgia was a microcosm
of this tension. In ordinary times, the Justices would have had no difficulty in
refusing federal relief to Aubry Williams, notwithstanding the clear
constitutional violation at his trial. The Georgia court's affirmance rested on
an "adequate, independent" state ground, and on this basis, as Dickson
indicates, all of the Justices except Black and Douglas (and all of the law
clerks) were prepared to deny certiorari. 23 But the fall of 1954 was not an
ordinary time: in Brown 1, the Court had just invalidated the core premise of
Jim Crow, that separate could be equal. Moreover, unlike with school
segregation, the constitutional fault found in the racially discriminatory practice
in Williams was not based upon a novel interpretive turn; as early as 1879, the
Supreme Court had held that racially biased jury selection violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.24 Accordingly, one could imagine a Supreme Court
ruling that, in light of the moral urgency arising from Brown I, state courts
were constitutionally obliged to strike down every instance of race
discrimination wherever they had discretionary authority to do so, especially
those instances where the racially discriminatory practice violated clear,
longstanding constitutional imperatives, as was the case with racially biased
jury selection.
Until the final three paragraphs of his opinion for the Court in Williams,
Justice Frankfurter seemed to be headed toward this result. Frankfurter
excavated Georgia precedents to demonstrate that the state courts had on
occasion chosen to waive the procedural bar to the constitutional claim, and
21. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OFBROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 684 (1976) (second alteration in original) (quoting Frankfurter's
memorandum).
22. Id. at 689 (quoting Jackson's memorandum of February 15, 1954).
23. Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v.
Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE LJ. 1423, 1433 (1994).
24. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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that as a matter of state law, Georgia courts had discretion to disregard such
formal barriers in order to accomplish substantive justice. Frankfurter did not,
however, draw the conclusion that because the state courts had discretion to
waive the procedural impediment, they were obliged to do so in order to
protect federal constitutional rights generally or rights against racial
discrimination specifically. Frankfurter relied on the existence of state-law
discretion only to conclude that the state court's decision against exercising its
discretion was not an independent, adequate state ground for disposing of a
federal constitutional claim that would deprive the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction. But having reached this conclusion, Frankfurter then made his
surprising turn-his turn toward Brown I. "[T]he fact," he stated, "that we
have jurisdiction does not compel us to exercise it."'
As if to explain this manuever, Frankfurter quoted extensively from a 1935
Supreme Court ruling, Patterson v. Alabama.26 In Patterson, the Alabama
Supreme Court had refused to consider on procedural grounds a jury
discrimination claim at the same time that it had dismissed on substantive
grounds this same claim in a companion case; upon subsequent review, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the substantive constitutional claim in the
companion case2 7 and remanded Patterson to the state court with the
suggestion that it might wish to reconsider its procedural dismissal in light of
the companion case's constitutional ruling. The Court noted that it was not
disregarding the existence of the adequate, independent state ground; to remand
for reconsideration, the Court said, "is not to review, in any proper sense of
the term, the decision of the state court upon a non-federal question, but only
to deal appropriately with a matter arising since its judgment and having a
bearing upon the right disposition of the case."28 On its face, however,
Patterson did not seem applicable to Williams, as Justice Clark pointedly
observed in his dissenting opinion. Clark correctly noted that, unlike in
Patterson, the Georgia Supreme Court in Williams already knew about the
prior constitutional ruling when it relied on the procedural ground to dismiss
the present claim; Frankfurter's reliance on Patterson, Clark charged, showed
"just how far the Court has 'stretched' here."'29
If the Court had viewed Williams as an ordinary case, Clark's rebuttal of
its reliance on Patterson would have been unanswerable. But there was an
added aspect to Patterson itself that neither Clark nor Frankfurter
mentioned-an aspect that showed why the Court majority viewed Williams
as more than an ordinary case and implicitly revealed not only the aptness of
25. 349 U.S. at 389.
26. 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
27. Nonis v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
28. Patterson, 294 U.S. at 607, quoted in Williams, 349 U.S. at 390.
29. 349 U.S. at 393.
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its citation to Patterson but also the linkage between the Court's dispositions
in Williams and Brown I.
Haywood Patterson was one of the nine so-called Scottsboro Boys, who
had been convicted in 1931 of raping two white women and sentenced to
death. The case attracted national attention and was widely regarded as a
travesty as well as a dramatic instantiation of the pervasive racial bias in the
Southern criminal justice system. In Powell v. Alabama," the Supreme Court
reversed all nine convictions on the grounds that the indigent defendants had
no attorney and that, in a capital case, the state was constitutionally obliged to
appoint counsel. Patterson v. Alabama was the second act of this drama in the
Supreme Court. On retrial, two of the original Scottsboro defendants, Patterson
and Norris, were again convicted and sentenced to death, but the trial judge,
James Edwin Horton, Jr., set aside the verdicts in an act of unusual personal
courage. In a third trial before a different judge, these two were yet again
convicted and sentenced to death; though both defendants had raised
constitutional objections to the racial composition of the jury venire,
Patterson's attorney had filed out of time, and it was on this basis that the state
supreme court affirmed his conviction. After the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
Norris' conviction based on the jury discrimination and remanded Patterson's
case for reconsideration, the state set aside Patterson's conviction. In a fourth
trial, he was convicted and sentenced to a prison term. This time, the state
supreme court affirmed the conviction, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
31
In retrospect, the first Scottsboro decision in Powell v. Alabama stands as
the harbinger of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court. Powell
was a striking innovation in constitutional doctrine and an encroachment by the
federal judiciary into matters that had traditionally been regarded as state
prerogatives; and although Powell was framed in universalist terms, it clearly
appeared to be impelled by the Supreme Court's unwillingness to tolerate the
indignities inflicted by the Southern racial caste system under the aegis of state
sovereignty. So too for the Warren Court: by the mid-1960's, the expansionist
federalizing propensity in Powell, initially driven by but not restricted to
Southern racial practices, had spread across the entire face of the Warren
Court's constitutional work, not only in criminal justice matters but more
broadly in such doctrinal areas as free speech and voting reapportionment.32
30. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31. Patterson v. State, 175 So. 371 (Ala.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 733 (1937).
32. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1965) ("[A]s a
thumbnail summary of the last two or three decades of speech issues in the Supreme Court, we may come
to see the Negro as winning back for us the freedoms the Communists seemed to have lost for us."); JACK
H. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 209 (1979) (quoting Chief Justice
Warren, "If Baker v. Carr had been in existence fifty years ago, we would have saved ourselves acute
racial troubles. Many of our problems would have been solved.., if everyone had the right to vote, and
his vote counted the same as everybody else's.")
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But this trend-which Frankfurter in particular would later resist on the ground
that it was driven more by the Justices' "personal moral convictions" than by
the "rule of law"-had not yet unfolded in 1955. In the early 1950's, the entire
Court was still visibly struggling to maintain the coherence of this distinction
in the face of the massive challenge to it raised by the palpably evil racial
caste system, the longstanding substantive legitimation of this system in
positive constitutional law, and its procedurally protected status behind the well
established doctrines of state prerogative.
In both Williams and Brown II, the Court attempted to combat the racial
caste system while acknowledging uncertainty as to whether such action was
permitted by positive law. In these opinions, the Justices held fast to the
distinction between their personal morality and legal authority and yet did not
disclaim their responsibility to pronounce moral judgment on positive law. To
put the matter in stark terms, if the Justices had simply bowed to the
(considerable) force of conventional legal doctrine and disavowed
responsibility for others' actions in maintaining school segregation or in
affirming Aubry Williams' conviction, they would have been like "good
Germans" who saw themselves bound to obey the law simply because it was
the law; but as they had recently seen, thus had totalitarian evil triumphed. If,
however, the Justices overturned the law simply because they found it morally
repellent, without respect for their limited institutional authority, they would
transform a "government of laws" into a "government of men"; also thus had
totalitarian evil triumphed.
In Williams and in the two Brown decisions, the Justices embraced the
same technique to balance the moral tension they felt from these two
antithetical commands. They proclaimed the racial caste system immoral but
did not purport to force this judgment on others; instead, they appealed to
others' legal and moral capacities to reach independent judgments and at the
same time emphatically urged them to reach the same conclusion regarding the
evil of the caste system. The core problem for the Justices was not their fear
that others would defy any command that they might impose. As the
contemporaneous juxtaposition of Williams and Brown makes clear, the core
problem was that their command, even if obeyed, would have been a dubious
means toward a good result and would have compromised the integrity of the
entire enterprise. This was not, as Alexander Bickel suggested, a preference for
expediency over principle-it was exactly the opposite.
The Scottsboro Boys cases generally, and Patterson v. Alabama in
particular, were especially appropriate precedents for the Court to invoke in
order to signify these intentions. The Court in 1932 and again in 1935 had
clearly indicated its disapproval of the racially discriminatory practices in these
cases and both ratified and legitimated the public moral sentiments that had
been widely expressed outside the South. But in Patterson, the Court visibly
and even ostentatiously deferred to the independent authority, acknowledged
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as such, of the Southern courts to consider whether specific remedial action
would be taken and, by implication, whether the Southern courts were prepared
to respond to the moral criticism that others had directed at them. The
Alabama court did indeed respond as the Supreme Court had hoped it would
in Patterson, granting the defendant a new trial notwithstanding the procedural
error that would have formally justified affirming his death sentence.33 State
officials were, moreover, apparently responsive in the other Scottsboro cases
as well. After the Supreme Court's first decision in Powell, four of the
defendants were released without retrial.34 Of those retried and again found
guilty, only Patterson and Norris were sentenced to death; when both men
were tried yet again after the second Supreme Court ruling on jury
discrimination, Norris alone was sentenced to death, but the governor of
Alabama commuted his sentence to life imprisonment.35 In light of the
powerful reasons to believe that all of the defendants were innocent of the rape
charges, these results were hardly a clear vindication of the fairness of the
American criminal justice system. But the responsiveness of the Alabama
officials to the spirit as well as the letter of the Supreme Court decisions in the
Scottsboro cases did make Patterson an apt example for the Justices to hold
out to the Georgia Supreme Court in Williams.
The Georgia Supreme Court emphatically refused to follow this example.
In its sharp response, the Georgia court charged that the Supreme Court had
demanded that it "supinely surrender sovereign [state] powers" and expressed
outrage that the Justices had sought to "influence or in any manner to interfere
with the functioning of this court on strictly State questions. Professor
Dickson's research does not indicate whether Chief Justice Duckworth, who
wrote the Georgia court's opinion, directly considered the implications of the
Supreme Court's citation of Patterson. The case and its general background
were so notorious in the South, however, that even twenty years later, it is
hard to believe that the reference was lost on Duckworth. From the angry tone
of Duckworth's rejoinder, it appears that, if he saw the allusion to the
Scottsboro case as such, he was much more insulted than persuaded by it.
From one perspective, the Scottsboro case could be viewed as an egregious
injustice promoted by the racial caste system but not as an indictment of the
inherent wrongfulness of the entire system. By contrast, Aubry Williams'
conviction was not an especially outrageous application of Jim Crow; unlike
for the Scottsboro boys, there was no plausible suggestion in the trial record
that Williams was innocent of the charged crime, and no specific harm to him
33. See DAN T. CARTER, SCO'rSBoRo: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 324-29 (1969).
34. Id. at 375-77.
35. Id. at 383-84.
36. Williams v. State, 88 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 1955).
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had been proven from the discriminatory jury selection process.37 Williams
was thus only a "garden variety" instance of the operation of the Southern
caste system. The Supreme Court in Patterson had asked the Southern court
to share its moral indignation at the unjust treatment of the Scottsboro Boys
and act on its own independent authority to remedy that injustice; but a
sympathetic Southern response to this moral appeal would not necessarily
acknowledge the evil of the entire caste system. The Supreme Court in
Williams, as well as in Brown II, was asking Southern courts to share its newly
heightened sense of moral urgency about the wrongfulness of Jim Crow in its
entirety, but in 1955, at least, Southern courts in particular and the white
Southern polity in general were not open to this appeal.
Was it then wrong for the Supreme Court to make this appeal for the
moral leaders of the white South to confess error? As a matter of tactical
expedience, perhaps the Court was wrong. Perhaps the Southern elite would
have acquiesced in a command for immediate school desegregation, just as
Chief Justice Duckworth reportedly told his son that his court "would have
complied quietly, if unhappily, with a Supreme Court order to grant Aubry
Williams a new trial."3 But in Williams' case, such an order would have
had, at best, a dubious legal warrant in light of the well established principle
that the Supreme Court had no authority to overturn a state decision resting on
adequate, independent state grounds. Chief Justice Duckworth's "quiet, if
unhappy" compliance would have been the obedience of the "good German"
who ignores the moral status of the orders issued by hierarchically superior
officers. In Williams, as in Brown II, the Supreme Court was not asking for
that kind of submission.
The Justices' appeal to the white South in these two cases in 1955 was the
same, though less eloquently stated, that Abraham Lincoln had issued in 1862
when, in the midst of the Civil War and four months before he issued his
Proclamation, he proposed compensated, voluntary emancipation by the white
slaveowners. "This proposal makes common cause for a common object," he
wrote, "casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the pharisee. The change
it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or
wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? '39 Lincoln did not succeed in
averting the terrible escalating destructiveness of the continuing war. The
consequences of the adamant Southern white resistance to Brown may not have
37. In the decision immediately prior to Williams, the Georgia Supreme Court had itself acknowledged
the racially discriminatory character of its jury selection process but nonetheless had affirmed the conviction
on the ground that no actual discrimination had been shown in the defendant's case; the Supreme Court
held the practice unconstitutional on its face, without requiring any demonstration of actual discrimination
in particular applications. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
38. Dickson, supra note 23, at 1458.
39. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Revoking General Hunter's Order of Military Emancipation of
May 9, 1862 (May 19, 1862), reprinted in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 222, 223
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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had the same physical dimensions, but there was equivalent, terrible damage
inflicted on the moral sensibility of our political life. Our generation again
tasted and thus re-learned the bitter lesson of the Civil War: that our political
associations with one another rested more fundamentally on coercion than on
a shared moral vision based on mutual respect.
Southern white resistance to Brown was a moral evil, inflicting continued
wrongful oppression on black people. But the common criticism today, in
response to this evil, that the Court was wrong in principle to withhold its
coercive mandate in Brown II, suggests an even deeper tragedy: we have lost
the ideal-the very ideal on which our moral condemnation of the racial caste
system is based-that social relations should not rest on force but on mutual
respect among equals.
In my own work, most recently in The Constitution in Conflict, I have
tried to reassert the jurisprudential meaning of this ideal. Before writing that
book, I wish I had had Del Dickson's research about the Williams case for the
added light it has cast on the Supreme Court's efforts at the beginning of the
Second Reconstruction in 1955 to avoid the tragic outcomes of the First.
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